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  The historical graveyards are cluttered with parties which dominated the political scene but which 
subsequently failed to adapt to new circumstances and therefore died, were absorbed by new more 
active movements, or withered into small marginal parties.[1] 
  There are few who challenge the centrality of political parties in the operation of contemporary, 
representative democracies. Parties are the chief means of linking people with government and the 
policy process.[2] They are the primary forces producing competitive elections and developing 
alternative political elites that are at the heart of modern representative democracy. Even as Western 
democratic parties faced crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, the prospects for their replacement by 
alternative organizations were slim.[3] They remain the central actors producing democracy and in 
making it work. 
  As the Union expands its jurisdiction, policy competencies, and powers, political parties might be 
expected to play an increasing role in efforts to assure democratic control. So far, there has been little 
evidence of the development of an entirely new party system for the European Union. Instead the trend 
has been toward adaptation of the existing national-level parties to actions on the European scene. I 
will argue that the lack of progress toward a European party system is the result of this national 
orientation: parties that are well designed to work at the national level are not appropriate at the 
European level.  If parties are the key to democracy, there will be a need to develop a new party system 




THEORIES OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
  Concern with the origins of political parties has been a neglected topic over the past three decades. 
After a flourish of interest in that topic when new parties were emerging in postwar Europe and the 
newly independent countries of Asia and Africa the subject has been ignored except for a few scholars. 
Now, as new democracies are emerging and as there are new concerns about improving or adapting 
democratic structures in long-established democracies there is a need for renewing our search for 
theories to explain party development. This is especially true as we look at the pattern of party politics 
in the European Union. To analyze the possible place of parties in the Union, it is useful to first review 
the conclusions of those who have studied the origins of parties and patterns of party development on 
the nation-state level. 
  In his classic study,[4] Maurice Duverger saw many parties as the evolutionary result of 
transforming political clubs and groupings among members of parliament in order to cope with the 
demands of an enlarged electorate. He also described later trends to create extra parliamentary parties 
that reflected important ideological causes. Above all, Duverger believed that the nature of the electoral system defined the party system. His concern with the electoral system is directed solely at 
the electoral law: proportional representation versus plurality systems and two-ballot systems. 
  Duverger also introduced the notion of party formation and modification in order to win elections. 
He argued that moderate and centrist parties often adopted organizational styles and tactics first 
developed by parties on the Left in order to more successfully compete in elections with broader 
electorates. This was what he called "contagion from the Left."[5] 
  Anthony Downs carried this forward in An Economic Theory of Democracy[6] when he saw 
parties as coalitions of people that seek to control government. Parties are driven by a "self interest 
axiom" that underlies all human behavior. For Downs, the single most important task for parties is to 
succeed in winning elections. As a result, parties structure themselves, develop electoral strategies, and 
shape policies in order to maximize their votes. Thus, parties emerge and develop in ways that will 
allow them to meet the electoral imperative of vote-maximization. 
  Joseph A. Schlesinger built on Downs' notions of party as a market-driven organization.[7] 
Adapting Mancur Olson's logic of collective action[8] to fit parties, Schlesinger focused on the 
ambitions of party members and supporters. For him, the key issue that structures the nature of parties 
is the set of political opportunities in the sense of public offices that are available directly or indirectly 
through party action. Again, parties are shaped by elections but more specifically through the drive for 
public office. Thus, "the structure and content of parties in democracies will reflect primarily what 
candidates and officeholders see as useful to their election and reelection."[9] 
  Not all students of party development focus on the electoral context. For many, political parties 
are means to bring social and ideological cleavages onto the political stage. Lipset and Rokkan saw 
parties as the reflection of the divisions and cleavages in society.[10] They argued that parties emerge 
through differing patterns of mobilization in order to reflect underlying social cleavages. Lipset and 
Rokkan noted four near-universal cleavages. Two cleavages are the result of the creation of the nation 
state: church vs. state; subject vs. dominant culture. Two are the product of the industrial revolution: 
workers vs. employers; primary vs. secondary economy. Political parties emerge to reflect the interests 
and causes linked with these cleavages. Parties then channel social discontent and policy demands 
based on social cleavages into the political system where it can be resolved or moderated. As Lipset 
and Rokkan noted: 
a competitive party system protects the nation against the discontents of its citizens: grievances and 
attacks are deflected from the overall system and directed toward the current set of power-holders."[11]  
  These social cleavages, although often dated and irrelevant by social change, remain important 
political divides and anchors in contemporary Western democracies.[12] 
  Leon Epstein's theory of party development is multi-faceted. He viewed parties as the product of 
their specific environmental conditions and  "developmental circumstances."[13] These circumstances 
include not only Duverger's enlargement of the suffrage and Lipset and Rokkan's cleavage patterns but 
also the nature of the political institutions within which the parties operate. Specifically, Epstein points 
to the impact of federalism or unitary structures and the nature of the relationship between the 
executive and legislative authority. Epstein does not ignore the electoral arrangements but he goes 
beyond the specifics of the electoral law to include the length of the ballot and what offices are elected. 
  From this rapid survey of theories of party origins and development I draw three key determinants 
of party organization and behavior: underlying socioeconomic and political cleavages, the structure of 
key political institutions, and the nature of electoral competition and rewards. In examining these 
dimensions of party structure and action, I will attempt to explore the emergence of a European party 
system within the context of the European Union. 
 
 
VOTER ALIGNMENTS AND A EUROPEAN-LEVEL PARTY SYSTEM 
 
 
  By and large, the political party systems of the European Union member states still conform to the 
alignments along social cleavages that are fifty or one hundred years old.[14] This is the case even 
though the issues directly related to the original Left/Right divisions -- such as the nature of democracy, 
the place of the church in society, and the economic role of government -- have been either resolved by 
political decisions or made irrelevant by social change. In the past two decades, the electoral impact of 
these cleavages has diminished in several countries.[15] Nevertheless, these social alignments still serve to establish the basic electoral coalitions in most countries. They remain the best predictors of 
electoral behavior.[16] 
  The durable nature of these social cleavages and their political alignments mean that many of the 
newer political issues facing political parties in the 1990s cut across these cleavages and their related 
parties. Inglehart and others have noted the emergence of an important new set of "post materialist" 
values that have little relationship to traditional party cleavages.[17] However, the alignment of parties 
still occurs primarily along traditional socioeconomic and political cleavages than in accordance with 
positions on the new values.  Environmental protection, civil liberties, social and political equity for 
women and ethnic minorities, immigration, and law enforcement are not issues that correspond with 
the older cleavages. They therefore pose problems for parties based on the traditional cleavages. Some 
of these parties' natural supporters end up on both sides of the new issues. 
  European unity is another issue that does not relate to the traditional cleavage patterns of the 
national political parties of EU member states. Support for integration has come from the full range of 
economic classes; so has opposition. Religious divisions within the Union occasionally stirs 
encouragement or resistance to unification but only in a most tangential and ephemeral way. 
Differences over the nature and value of democracy produce opposition to European unity only in the 
marginal and fringe parties whose commitment to liberal democracy is suspect. Regionalism is 
sometimes associated with support or opposition to integration but the alignment is neither consistent 
nor strong. The European issue seems more a subterfuge for regional conflict over economic and social 
concerns rather than a true reflection of regional differences. 
  As I shall argue below, the internal differences over European unification within parties are 
usually greater than the differences over the issue between parties. The fact that this debate is within 
parties rather than between them demonstrates the irrelevance of the principal parties based on 
traditional cleavages to European debates. But there is no evidence to suggest that there is a new 
cleavage emerging within member country societies to reflect the European issues. Europe is certainly 
not a Left/Right issue in the traditional sense. Table 1 demonstrates that attitudes on Europe -- positive, 
ambivalent, or negative -- are virtually the same across the political spectrum. The usual Left/Right 
distinction does not seem to easily correlate into support or opposition to European integration.[18] 
With domestic politics still oriented toward the old ideological divisions, the virtual identical spread of 
opinions across the Left/Right spectrum explains why European integration has not emerged as more 
of a partisan issue. 
  Several European parties have very public internal divisions over Europe. At present, the British 
Conservative party is a paramount example with well-defined internal divisions between increasingly 
doctrinaire Euroskeptics and advocates of further European cooperation. Similar divisions exist in the 
Gaullist party in France and the Danish Social Democrats, with less intense divisions in many other 
parties throughout the Union. In the past, the British Labour party, Greece's New Democracy, and 
Spain's Popular party have all experienced intense internal debate on European unification.   Even 
within parties generally united in their support of the concept of European unity, there exist wide 
ranges of often strongly held opinions about how fast and how far unification should proceed, about 
which issues should have priority, and about the division of sovereignty between the national states 
and the emerging European state. 
  But these visible, internal party disputes over Europe are not always reflected in the attitudes of 
their voters. Table 2 shows the attitudes toward Europe of party identifiers in each country. Almost 
everywhere in Europe, the differences on Europe within the major political parties are more significant 
than the differences between these parties on issues of European integration. And this is true of many 
of the parties whose elites dispute European issues in public. 
  Such a cross-party pattern of differences on European integration causes few problems at the 
national level. Divisions over Europe usually can be minimized by emphasis on domestic issues that 
unite the party and make it an effective voice for a specific set of significant social groups and interests. 
However, on the European level, the national parties' internal divisions are over the very essence of 
what parties should be saying and representing in Brussels and Strasbourg. As a result, these intra-
party divisions over the nature, priorities, extent, and future of European unity make the existing 
national parties poor substitutes for a European party system. 
  In the past, these internal party divisions were easier to control and ignore. Until the end of the 
cold war, European unity was defended as a necessity in the face of the communist threat from within 
as well as from the east. A broad consensus at the elite level limited discussion about fundamental issues of European unification; to oppose unification was to undermine western solidarity and to give 
comfort to the opponents of democracy. In addition, the undeniable economic successes of the early 
years of the EEC and broad public support for its institutions produced what Lindberg and Scheingold 
referred to as a "permissive consensus" that allowed the development of the European Community.[19] 
The paramount virtue of the goal of a united Europe allowed minor disagreements over specific 
modalities and policies to be accommodated within parties. Europe was still in its infancy and did not 
seem to pose a real threat to national sovereignty or the integrity of national institutions. 
  Now, of course, the setting is much different. The need for western solidarity evaporated with the 
fall of communism and with that the pariah status for opponents of European unification also 
disappeared. The growth of the EU in membership, competencies, and ambitions poses immediate 
threats to sovereign powers and institutions at the national level. The consensus -- beyond some 
ritualistic acceptance of the desirability of a vague European unity -- is now endangered at both the 
elite and popular levels. As a result, even parties that have been solid supporters of a united Europe 
now experience more internal division over the extent, specific details, and pace of unification. 
  Clearly, the broad issue of support or opposition to European unification does not correspond with 
existing cleavage structures in the member countries. But do these cleavages and the resulting parties 
have meaning in dealing with the more detailed European decisions that parties may wish to take such 
as on environmental protection, the social contract, regional development, movement toward a single 
currency, Union support for research and development, equity and social solidarity, and so on? The 
evidence on party alignments at the European level on such micro-issues suggests again little 
differentiation among main parties even though such issues do distinguish them at the national level. In 
part, this is because there is a tendency to use such microissues as proxies to carry on broader battles 
over the macroissues of the degree and speed of integration and the role of the European Parliament in 
making these macrodecisions. The shifting of perspective from narrow and specific issue to broader 
ones confuses party alignments even on the microissues where traditional cleavages might have some 
relevance. 
  In sum, national parties of EU member states still reflect traditional lines of cleavage. They are 
internally divided on the broad issues of European integration; they often interpret even the more 
narrow microissues in terms of the relationship of these issues to the broader concern with the extent 
and pace of integration. No new parties have emerged at the national level to reflect public divisions 
over European unification although some fringe parties have picked up on public resentment toward 
Europe to bolster support for broader agendas that are unrelated to European issues. The emergence of 
a European party system, then, is handicapped so far by the failure of parties to develop and represent 
emerging cleavage structures based on European issues. 
 
 
EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
 
  Many of the fifteen member countries of the European Union are among the best examples of the 
"party government" model of representative democracy. Where party government prevails, political 
parties provide policy options to the voters; the winning party or parties forms a government controlled 
by its adherents; party discipline and cohesion then allow the party-dominated government to adopt 
and implement policies in line with its electoral promises. Of course, there are often gaps between this 
ideal model of party government and the actual performance of parties in power.[20] But even in those 
EU countries where the party government model is least developed, political parties play crucial 
political roles and dominate internal politics. 
  The emerging EU protostate, however, is one where political parties are virtually powerless. 
Political parties exist, as we shall see, but they play remarkably small parts in setting agendas, shaping 
policy, or defending that policy to their electorates. As a result, they are not able to perform the linkage 
task expected of democratic political parties. 
  In part, the exclusion of parties is the legacy of institutions that evolved out of international 
agreements where party politics generally was avoided. Building Europe was a key element of the 
postwar political consensus. The European institutions reflected the unanimity and non-partisan 
approach to integration adopted by the principal political parties in each of the member states. An 
additional explanation of the weak party presence is found in on-going struggles for power among European institutions which lead politicians in particular institutions to mute their partisan differences 
in order to strengthen their hand in seeking greater influence from other EU institutions. 
 
Parties and the European Commission 
 
  The key European policy institutions -- the Commission and the Council of Ministers -- are by 
their very nature multipartisan. National governments appoint Commissioners and they usually appoint 
individuals from the government's own party or coalition. The recognition of the lack of partisanship in 
Commission affairs is supported by the fact that the five countries entitled to two Commissioners often 
name one from the government party or parties and the other from an opposition party, something that 
they would never do for an important domestic appointive office. Since the party composition of the 
fifteen member states is inevitably varied, the Commission always is a body with representatives from 
a broad range of party backgrounds. In addition, Commissioners may have a different political 
affiliation than the current home governments since they are appointed for fixed, five year terms that 
do not coincide with electoral cycles in the member countries. Often a Commissioner appointed by one 
government will remain in office long after that government has been replaced by its rival. 
  The nature of the individuals selected as Commissioners also tends to limit partisan influences in 
the European body. Often, governments send senior civil servants with little background in partisan 
politics as their nominees to the Commission. They are instead primarily noted for their technical 
expertise and administrative skills. Many of the most prominent Commissioners came from civil 
service backgrounds with little or no experience in party politics: Walter Hallstein, Jean Monnet, Sicco 
Mansholt. Monnet, for example reflects the anti-party sentiments common among technocrats in his 
comments on joining a political party: "How can one affiliate to a system over which one has no 
control? ...  To belong to a [political] party, the very phrase repels me."[21] When governments do 
send politicians, they often send individuals who are just below the top rank.[22] In many cases, they 
are senior politicians who are ready to withdraw from the partisan exchanges of the past. For example, 
Britain's Conservative government nominated Neil Kinnock, the former Labour party leader who had 
withdrawn from party leadership after his party's 1992 electoral defeat. France recently named a 
former prime minister to the Commission, Edith Cresson, but her career was on the decline after her 
short and inglorious experience as prime minister. One Commissioner, noting the trend to appoint 
those nearing retirement, noted "It is akin to being put out to pasture." Whatever the stage of the 
nominee's career, governments generally send individuals with an interest in and a commitment to 
Europe to serve on the Commission. They avoid nominations of members of extremist parties or of 
individuals from extremist factions within the major parties.[23] 
  The political heterogeneity of the Commission leads to the avoidance of openly partisan positions. 
Partisan preferences tend to be muted and to be filtered through the sieve of Union values and 
priorities. Since the Commission's proposals must always be approved by a Council made up of a 
variety of national party leaders, openly partisan stands must be avoided. The Commissioners also 
know that their success in presenting new Union policies and in administering the existing policies 
depends upon their own internal unity, which is best assured by skirting ideological or partisan stands. 
  Of course, ideological views are present in the Commission and find their way into policy 
proposals. For example, the Social Charter was strongly influenced by the socialist orientations of 
Jacques Delors, president of the Commission and a French socialist, and of Greece's Vasso Papandreou, 
the Commissioner charged with the preparation of that proposal. But there are also examples of 
Commissioners who seem to ignore their ideological roots once in Brussels. For example, the current 
Commissioner in charge of competition is Karel Van Miert, a Belgian and former socialist deputy. His 
socialist party background might lead us to expect that he would be tolerant of dirigiste policies and 
government subsidies to troubled industries. But this has not been the case; Van Miert has been a 
vigorous opponent of efforts by national governments to subsidize their industries. 
  On the whole, there is little evidence of openly partisan or  ideological wrangling within the 
Commission. Party backgrounds and ideologies rarely intrude into the Commission's otherwise open 
discussion and debate. The absence of partisanship is not necessarily a positive feature. The 
Commission is usually seen as the driving force of European unification; the limitation of party 
influence in the Commission leaves political parties out of shaping the direction of integration and 
most of the specific policies that emanate from that body. 
 Parties and the European Council of Ministers 
 
  The same mixture of many parties is found in the European Union's Council of Ministers. This 
body is made up of government ministers, usually parliamentary or party leaders, from each of the 
member states. Since there is always a difference in the party composition controlling the fifteen 
national governments -- ranging from socialists to Christian democrats to conservatives and others, 
there is always a diversity of parties present in the Council. Council participants are national ministers 
who are also usually top rank politicians. Party considerations tend to be greater on the Council than on 
the Commission because of this. However, the very diversity of parties represented on the Council and 
the varying agendas for similar parties from different countries keeps partisan posturing at a minimum. 
  Another feature of the EU Council of Ministers sometimes further weakens party alignments. The 
Council's membership varies with the subject matter under consideration. For example, when 
agriculture is on the agenda, it is the ministers of agriculture who meet; when it is transportation, it is 
the ministers of transportation. This compartmentalization of Council policy making allows ministers 
with strong personal attachments to the issue that may not correspond with their own parties' 
preferences to act according to their consciences. For example, ministers of the environment often find 
themselves neglected in their domestic councils of ministers; at the European level they meet with 
kindred spirits and can blame any departures from party line to constraints of bargaining with their 
European colleagues. A recent example came in 1992 when the ministers of health meeting as a EU 
Council of Ministers directed the Commission to draft new guidelines on health and nutrition, issues 
that were highly sensitive in several countries. The Commission soon backed away from that volatile 
issue too but the point is that compartmentalization permitted ministers at the European level to shunt 
aside party and domestic political considerations that could not be avoided at the national level. 
  An additional factor at work in minimizing partisan influences is the Council's norm of seeking 
consensus. Even though rules now allow more decisions to be made by majority or qualified majority 
votes on the Council, in practice the Council continues to strive for policies that all members will 
accept. This places the emphasis on consensus-building rather than on partisanship. 
  The Council is the EU body most explicitly tied to national governments but Council participants 
tend to focus on defending national interests and issues of sovereignty rather than on domestic political 
matters. The secrecy and less publicity of most EU Council sessions allows the avoidance of partisan 
politics, both domestic and European.   Indeed, it is not unusual for highly partisan politicians to take 
very accommodating and non-partisan stances at odds with their usual ideological orientations in 
Brussels that they would never adopt in their national capitals. 
  Finally, the operation of the Council usually reflects intergovernmental negotiations where 
specific party considerations within countries as well as between them are rarely evident. Here, the 
legacy of the EU as an international organization continues to influence its policy-making processes. 
When the Council is divided, the cleavages are more often along the lines of national interests or big 
nations versus little nations or less-developed southern states against more-industrialized northern 
countries. It is highly unusual for EU Council of Ministers participants to align themselves along party 
distinctions in their deliberations on EU policy. EU Council ministers who are not on speaking terms 
with members of rival parties at home sit alongside other EU ministers from parties allied with their 
domestic opponents. One of the rare occasions when party considerations intruded into EU Council of 
Ministers activities occurred earlier this year when several ministers participating in Council meeting 
refused to greet or shake hands with the Italian minister who was associated in domestic politics with 
the Italian neo-fascist party. 
 
Parties and the European Parliament 
 
  Unlike the muted party presence in the Council and the Commission, parties are very much in 
evidence in the European Parliament. Members of the European Parliament have formed party groups 
that cross national lines. In the current Parliament, there are nine groups, all of which include deputies 
from three or more countries. (See Table 3.) The members of the European Parliament (MEPs) sit and 
vote as parties rather than as national delegations. Voting cohesion within the groups is high although 
not as strong as in comparable parties at the national level. The groups meet regularly to discuss 
positions and issues. Each has its own secretariat and staff, with size varying according to the number of MEPs in the group. Speaking time on the floor of Parliament is allocated to the party groups, again 
according to their size.[24] 
  Despite the parties' presence in Parliament, they are able to exert little influence over the Union's 
life. It was once fair to explain this by referring to the Parliament's own limited role. But the European 
Parliament is now emerging as a more effective and powerful force in EU affairs and in setting the 
agenda for European decision-making.[25] But the parties that are found there still have little voice in 
shaping European decisions or setting priorities for Europe. While the party groups play highly visible 
roles in the European Parliament, they are at best only weak reflections of the powerful national parties 
found in the EU member states. 
  Voting cohesion within the various European Parliamentary groups is high.[26] This is often used 
to support the claim that national loyalties are set aside in favor of European perspectives. The 
cohesion is impressive given the fact that the European groups are nearly all coalitions of national 
parties who join together in Strasbourg for a variety of reasons, often more pragmatic than they are 
programmatic. Often members of the same European parliamentary group defend quite different 
positions from one another in their separate countries' domestic politics. In addition, several European 
parliamentary groups include two or more parties from the same country. For example, between 1989 
and 1994, the Socialist group in Strasbourg had three rival Italian parties, two British, and two Belgian 
parties in its ranks. These parties oppose each other in national politics but come together on the 
European scene if only to allow them a place in a legislative group. 
  The cohesion of parliamentary groups is also somewhat misleading. Most of the votes of record in 
the European Parliament command broad, intergroup support. Cohesion between the major groups is 
probably nearly as great as that within groups. For procedural, pragmatic, and political reasons, 
parliamentary leaders always strive for consensus across party lines.[27] The body's rules of procedure 
call for the congress of party group presidents to "endeavour to reach a consensus on matters referred 
to it." This is part of the typical search for accommodation and consensus that is characteristic of all 
EU decision making. As one observer notes, 
Parliament's consensual method runs deep, and great effort is made to take on board as many views as 
possible.[28]  
  This non-partisanship is reflected in the comments of a British MEP who reported he enjoyed the 
European Parliament more than his service in the British House of Commons because "while both 
argued interminably, talk in the Commons was all about disagreement while in Europe it was directed 
to seeking agreement."[29] 
  There is also a good dose of pragmatism behind the search for broad majorities. Many 
parliamentary votes require special majorities: absolute majorities of the membership or two-thirds 
majority votes. Since no single party group has ever had more than a third of the seats and since 
absenteeism is high and a problem in meeting required absolute majorities, broad coalitions are needed. 
  Nearly all major votes feature the cooperation of the three largest groups -- the Party of European 
Socialists and the European People's party (Christian democratic) -- and the smaller Liberal, 
Democratic and Reformist group. Together, these three parties account for over two thirds of the votes 
in Parliament. Indeed, it is correct to speak about the situation in Strasbourg as a "party oligopoly" 
based on the long-term joint domination of Parliament by these three parties since the 1979 
introduction of popular elections.[30] 
  The political reason for non-partisanship, equally important, is that strong the European 
Parliament sees itself in a contest for power with other EU institutions more than it sees itself as an 
arena for developing or expressing partisan differences. Broad, near unanimous votes in Parliament are 
seen as a means of enhancing the institution's voice in European affairs. This is especially the case over 
the last decade as the Parliament has unified in pursuit of its own power and prerogatives. 
Parliamentary leaders have called publicly for MEPs to vote only for those measures that will enhance 
the powers of the Parliament rather than on the merits of specific proposals.[31] As a result, more often 
than not, the struggle between the Parliament and the Commission or EU Council for greater 
parliamentary power overrides partisan concerns in the debates and votes in Strasbourg. A good case in 
point can be seen in the European Parliament's ratification of Jacques Santer as new EU Commission 
president in June 1994. After a sharp debate which focused more on the Parliament's need to be 
respected by other EU institutions, the Parliament narrowly approved Santer's nomination by a vote of 
260 for, 238 against, and 23 abstentions. The issues were less Santer's partisan ties, qualifications for 
the job, or political positions than it was the MEPs desire to claim a greater say in EU politics. One parliamentary leader stated their goal quite baldly: "We are determined not to be taken for granted. The 
net result of [this] vote [on Santer] will be greater parliamentary influence over the Commission."[32] 
It was an unusual coalition of Greek and Spanish socialists who did not want to embarrass their own 
governments, neo-fascists from Italy, and the bulk of the Christian Democrats who made up the narrow 
majority that endorsed Santer. 
  There are European-wide associations of the major party groupings that coincide with the 
European parliamentary groups: socialists, Christian democrats, and liberals.[33] Some observers had 
expected the transnational parties to acquire greater strength and meaning once the European 
Parliament shifted to a popular election. But that has not happened. After an initial growth in pan-
European party activity in 1979, the transnational parties resumed their minor roles.[34] They remain 
weak, led by aging or second rate national party leaders, underfinanced, and often divided on European 
issues. They sometimes issue campaign statements for the European elections but these statements are 
then largely ignored at the national level when the campaigns get underway. 
  The party groups do play the key role in managing the affairs of the European Parliament with 
control over agenda, debate, and voting. To that extent, they have political significance. But these 
parliamentary groups have not developed close ties with their associated national parties nor have they 
built their own organizations at the national and grassroots level in the member states. The European 
"parties in parliament" have at best weak ties with the transnational parties that correspond to their 
political tendencies which in turn have only ephemeral linkages to the functioning national parties. 
  More than fifteen years after the introduction of a popularly elected European Parliament, there is 
no indication that the expected emergence of parties from that body -- as parties had developed in the 
history of most national parliaments -- has happened and nor is there much evidence that it may 
happen in the foreseeable future. At the national level, the governmental and policy-making 
institutions that parallel these European bodies are the principal arenas of party politics. If the political 
parties do not dominate these institutions in all the member countries, they are nevertheless clearly the 
principal actors. They are what make democracy work at the national level. On the European level, 
however, the parties are secondary or tertiary actors. Broadly excluded from the Commission and the 
Council, they do find a presence in Parliament. But they have more a symbolic presence rather than 
powerful role even in the European Parliament. 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION 
 
 
  In most democratic countries electoral competition is the lifeblood of the party system. Parties 
emerge to take part in that competition; they transform themselves in order to better compete.[35] The 
nature of electoral competition thus shapes the parties and their relationships to one another. There are 
very limited electoral opportunities in the emerging European state. As we have seen, the key positions 
on the Commission and Council are appointive ones linked to domestic politics. The only European 
electoral campaigns are those organized every five years to elect a Parliament still struggling to gain 
recognition as an important actor. 
  The shift to direct, popular elections of the MEPs beginning in 1979 might have been expected to 
produce new parties or changes in the existing parties. These elections offered a new set of political 
opportunities and a very different form of electoral arena. However, the anticipated party changes did 
not occur, not only because of Parliament's limited power, but at least equally because of the ways in 
which the elections occur. The European parliamentary elections are faulted in three ways: they attract 
less able politicians; they are conducted more as national elections over domestic issues than as 
European elections; and they fail as a means of linking citizens with European institutions, including 
the Parliament.   Together, these deficiencies have prevented European electoral competition from 
either creating new European parties or transforming national parties to make them more concerned 
with European elections or issues. 
  The European Parliament has still to claim its power and prestige. As a result, those who run for 
the European Parliament tend to be second-level politicians, usually on the down side rather than the 
rising end of their careers. They also include politicians who have lost in national elections and need a 
temporary sinecure to hold them over until the next election at home. The few politicians of national 
repute elected to the European Parliament are usually among those who rarely attend. Recently, news reports noted that one very prominent Italian leader had been in Strasbourg so rarely that when he did 
show up to vote on the accession of four new member states in 1994, he was unable to vote on the first 
two because he did not know how to use his voting card.[36] These may be influential leaders but they 
are not the kind of parliamentarians likely to exert important control over the either the general 
processes of unification or the details of European policies. As the Parliament gains in stature and 
power, it may eventually attract more capable and interested politicians. In the meantime, it is clearly 
not an arena where ambitious party leaders find it useful to devote their time and partisan efforts. 
  The campaigns for the European Parliament are dominated by domestic rather than European 
politics. The parties that conduct these elections are the national ones and, in general, they do not take 
these elections very seriously. They devote less attention and resources to European elections than to 
national or even local elections. In some cases where public campaign finances are fixed, they even 
"save" some of the money given them for the European campaigns for other domestic political 
purposes.[37] The parties nominate less significant leaders for the European Parliament. More often 
than not, they conduct the campaign to serve domestic political objectives rather than to debate 
European issues. One observer correctly notes that European elections are simply national elections on 
a European scale.[38] Such campaigns offer opportunities for voters to express opinions on the parties' 
domestic records rather than on questions of European policy. 
  National politicians see the European elections as a time to conduct a mid-term referendum on the 
performance in office of the governing parties at home. As a consequence, European election 
campaigns are often frequently dominated by national issues rather than European ones.   When 
European themes are elicited in the campaign -- and this is exceptional apart from a few minor parties 
who oppose integration as part of a broader critique of contemporary society, the debate focuses on the 
broad questions of how much integration is desirable and how fast it should proceed rather than on 
positions on specific policy issues likely to come before the European Parliament. The MEPs who are 
elected in such campaigns thus go to Strasbourg without a clear mandate from their voters. 
  Parties have a hard time asserting themselves on the European level because their own voters 
refuse to take them seriously as vehicles of their European viewpoints. Voters are less likely to follow 
the European elections and they turn out at the polls at much lower rates. Overall turnout for the 1994 
European Parliamentary elections was the lowest ever. Indeed, contrary to expectations, electoral 
turnout has declined steadily in every European election: 63 percent in 1979, 61 percent in 1984, 58 
percent in 1989, and 56 percent in 1994. In the largest countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and 
Spain), the 1994 turnout ranged from a low of 36.4 percent in Britain to a high of 74.8 percent in Italy, 
significantly lower than turnout for national or even local elections in every member country. 
European elections are seen as "second-order" elections -- elections that count for little -- since they do 
not affect the distribution of power on the national level or in the local city halls. It is national elections 
that voters still see, and correctly so, as the seat of real power. As a result, voters use European 
elections to send messages to the parties in power and to vote for smaller parties with narrow, single 
issue agendas that voters may support in such second order elections without losing a chance to be a 
part of making the decision of who rules. One observer notes that voters feel "liberated" in European 
elections and often use them as a time to vote against their preferred parties in order to vote for minor 
parties or to protest against their usual party.[39] 
 
 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES AND EUROPEAN POLITICS 
 
 
  Some observers note the difficulty in building a "new" European party system. The national 
parties are in place and they do not intend to yield their place to new European parties. Consequently, 
there has been no transfer of party sovereignty from national parties to transnational parties to match 
the shifts in sovereignty over policy matters.[40] Nor does such a transfer seem likely to occur. The 
principal parties, even when they are seemingly out of touch with the voters, are very adept at 
defending themselves against domestic challengers; they are likely to have even less trouble repelling 
threats to their preeminence from new or existing European transnational parties. 
  The national parties have largely stayed aloft from European issues. As I pointed out above, party 
alignments with respect to general political tendencies are not correlated with attitudes on the pace and 
goals of European integration. People's attitudes on Europe vary as much within the parties they claim to support as between them.   Consequently, the broader questions of European integration as well as 
specific policy issues under consideration are rarely issues of interparty debate in national politics. A 
good case in point was in the first round of the recent French presidential elections. The French 
president is clearly France's most prominent policy maker on Europe but European issues were nearly 
entirely left out of the campaign.   Initially, it was thought that the campaign might include debates 
over Europe between the two leading Gaullist contenders. But the issue was scarcely discussed by 
these candidates or the other leading candidates. Only a minor candidate, Philippe de Villiers, who was 
able to muster less than five percent of the vote made Europe a prominent issue in his campaign. 
  The major parties in nearly all member countries seem curiously uninterested in addressing either 
the broad macroissue of how much and how fast integration and the microissues of specific policy 
positions on the broadening array of Brussels-based decision making. This is perhaps the greatest 
problem for those who see the national parties developing into appropriate vehicles for linking citizens 
with European policy concerns. 
  Evidence of the principal parties' unwillingness to address European issues can be seen in the 
troubled and lengthy process of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty.[41] Unlike the original Treaties of 
Rome that went through the national parliaments with very little or no debate, the Maastricht treaty 
ratification process produced lengthy and difficult debates in several countries with longstanding 
reputations as strong advocates of unification, notably Germany and France. In Britain, where 
European attachments are shallower, the process was especially painful taking 210 hours of 
parliamentary debate to deal with over 600 amendments before the third reading of the ratification 
document.[42] While it is easy to misinterpret the public debates over ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the principal parties clearly did not reflect the uneasiness of their voters about Europe. Table 4 
shows the virtual unanimity of parliaments in supporting the treaty, a unanimity that was not reflected 
in public opinion polls and in the referendums that were held in the three countries holding 
referendums on the Maastricht Treaty. Consensus may still exist at the elite level but it appears that 
consensus at the popular level is no longer present. Yet public disquietude is not reflected in the 
principal government or opposition political parties. 
  A study of middle level party elites in several EU countries revealed remarkably little interest in 
European issues. In Germany, for example, 79-90 leaders from the major parties reported that 
European issues were rarely or never discussed at local party meetings even though the poll was 
conducted shortly before or shortly after European elections.[43] There are, of course, party activists 
who do become interested in European issues but they are usually unable to bring the issues to the 
forefront of their parties. These European specialists tend to be few in number, less involved in party 
policy setting, and less likely to be on the fast track to leadership positions.[44] 
  The only parties that directly take the issue of European unification to the people are fringe parties 
-- especially nationalist parties on the far Right. However, in most cases their evocation of European 
themes is used more as an ancillary theme to exploit public uneasiness about Europe. They seem more 
interested in expanding their electorates than to truly enter into the debate on Europe.[45] Usually 
these fringe parties and their voters have other items at the top of their agendas and address Europe as 
only a peripheral concern. So far these extremist parties bring along so many concerns about their 
commitment to democracy and internal authoritarianism that their electoral appeal is limited. Whether 
or not their success in exploiting economic nationalism suggests perhaps the beginning of a new social 
cleavage upon which a European party system may be founded -- one based on new parties espousing 
European or national approaches to economic and social issues -- is still very much unclear. 
  In summary, the national parties are not ready to assume the linkage function between citizens and 
the developing European polity. European integration remains a peripheral interest to most parties and 
not one seen as effective in mobilizing voters. To the extent that the parties address European issues, it 






  There are few signs of an emerging European party system either in the form of a set of new 
European parties or through national parties capable of addressing European concerns. This fact, more 
than the limitations on the power of the European Parliament, is the principal cause of the current democratic deficit in the European Union. And this situation is likely to continue. Political party 
loyalties seem to endure even as the cleavages on which they were originally based change or 
disappear. The European institutions, including Parliament, are inimical to partisan politics. European 
elections have offered neither the competitive pressures nor the opportunities for ambitious leaders that 
might stimulate party transformation. The principal national parties remain little interested in European 
questions. These national parties are not likely to yield their preeminence to new ones at home or 
abroad. They have proved their durability in overcoming the party crises of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
New parties and alternative organizations have not had the impact on party systems that most thought 
they would. If the national parties can withstand such domestic challenges, they are well-placed to 
overcome any supranational rivals. And they can continue to ignore the European issues because their 
voters persist in seeing domestic issues as more important than European issues even in spite of the 
very real transfer of sovereignty to Brussels. 
  Political scientists and advocates of democratizing Europe can argue persuasively on behalf of a 
new European party system. But the fundamental reality of political party persistence is still 
unchallenged. As Peter Merkl put it: 
Like old soldiers, it seems, old parties just about never die no matter how often they may have 
disgraced themselves. Worse yet, they do not even seem to have the decency to fade away in accord 
with long-range, secular erosion processes at their particular base. Instead, they hang on tenaciously to 
their strategic positions in the party system, taking advantage of the voters' inertia and lack of viable 
options and perhaps attracting new groups of supporters to make up for those whom they have 
alienated.[47] 
 
Table 1   SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY POLITICAL FAMILY IN ALL EU 
MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1993 
.         Respondents identifying with the: 
.         Left Center Right 
Positive    59%   55%    54% 
Ambivalent  34    38     37 
Negative     7     7      9 
[Based on responses to two questions: "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) 
membership in the European Community is: good thing, bad thing, neither good nor bad?" and "In 
general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? For very much; for to 
some extent; against to some extent; against very much." Positive attitude required a "good" to the first 
question and "for very much" or "for somewhat" to the second question.] 
















1. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," in 
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 7. 
2. Kay Lawson, ed., Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1980. 3. See Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl, eds., When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). See especially Merkl's concluding chapter, "The 
Challengers and the Party System," pp. 561-588. 
4. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963). 
5. Ibid., p. xxvii. 
6. New York: Harper & Row, 1957. 
7. Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). 
8. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
9. Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office, p. 28. 
10. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter 
Alignments," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National 
Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967. 
11. Ibid., p. 4. 
12. Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in 
the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988), pp. 
127-175. 
13. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967). 
14. Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies. 
15. See for example, Mark N. Franklin, The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis 
of Electoral Choice 1964-1983 (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1985); Patrick Michel, 
"Christianisme: La D‚saffection des fidŠles," in Jean-Yves Potel, L'Etat de la France et ses habitants 
(Paris: Editions de la D‚couverte, 1985); Russell J. Dalton, et al., Electoral Change in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Ivor Crewe and D.T. 
Denver, Electoral Change in Western Democracies (New York: St. Martin's, 1985). 
16. See Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies; Peter Mair, "Myths of Electoral Change and 
the Survival of Traditional Parties," European Journal of Political Research 24 (No. 2, 1993) : 121-133; 
Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage, 1991); Guy Michelat and Michel Simon, Classe, religion et comportement politique (Paris: 
Fondation National des Sciences Politiques, 1977); and Anthony Heath, et al., How Britain Votes 
(Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1985). 
17. Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990). See also Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and 
Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
18. For evidence on the lack of impact of ideological stances on support for Europe within and among 
socialist parties, see Kevin Featherstone, Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative 
History (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1988). 
19. Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the 
European Community (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 62. 
20. Richard Rose, The Problem of Party Government (London: Macmillan, 1974). 
21. Fran‡ois Duchˆne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (New York: Norton, 
1994), p. 346. 
22. Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 3rd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1994), p. 87. 
23. Ibid., p. 88. 
24. On the early life of parliamentary groups, see John Fitzmaurice, The Party Groups in the European 
Parliament (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975). 
25. George Tsebelis, "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," 
American Political Science Association 88 (March 1994): 128-142. See also David Judge, David 
Earnshaw, and Ngaire Cowan, "Ripples or Waves: The European Parliament in the European 
Community Policy Process," Journal of European Public Policy 1 (June 1994): 27-52. 
26. Luciano Bardi, "Transnational Party Federations, European Parliamentary Party Groups, and the 
Building of Europarties," in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, eds., How Parties Organize: Change and 
Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), pp. 
366-369. See also Fulvio Attin , "The Voting Behaviour of the European Parliament Members and the 
Problem of the Europarties," European Journal of Political Research 18 (1990): 557-79. 27. Martin Westlake, A Modern Guide to the European Parliament (London: Pinter, 1994), pp. 110-
112. 
28. Ibid., p. 187. 
29. Enid Lakeman, "Elections to the European Parliament, 1989," Parliamentary Affairs 43 (January 
1990): 88. 
30. Ibid., pp. 184-188. 
31. Robert Ladrech, "Social Democratic Parties and EC Integration," European Journal of Political 
Research 24 (1993): 206-7. 
32. Financial Times, 22 July 1994. 
33. Geoffrey Pridham and Pippa Pridham, Transnational Party Cooperation and European Integration: 
The Process Towards Direct Elections (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981). 
34. Karlheinz Reif and Oskar Niedermayer, "The European Parliament and the Political Parties," 
Journal of European Integration 10 (Nos. 2 & 3, 1987) : 172. See also Geoffrey Pridham, "European 
Elections, Political Parties and Trends of Internalization in Community Affairs," Journal of Common 
Market Studies 24 (June 1986): 285. 
35. Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of Western European Political Party Systems," in Joseph 
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1966). 
36. Financial Times (London), 31 May 1994. 
37. Hermann Schmitt, "Party Attachment and Party Choice in the European Elections of June 1989: A 
Cross-National Comparative Analysis of the Post-Electoral Surveys of the European Voters Study 
1989," International Journal of Public Opinion Research 2 (No. 2, 1990): 170. 
38. Lakeman, "Elections to the European Parliament, 1989," pp. 867. 
39. Kathleen Reif, Ten European Elections (Aldershot, England: Gower, 1985). 
40. Reif and Niedermayer, "The European Parliament and the Political Parties," p. 167. 
41. See Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker, eds., The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, 
Debates and Future Implications (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994). 
42. David Baker, Andrew Gamble, and Steve Ludlam, "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: 
Conservative Divisions and British Ratification," Parliamentary affairs 47 (January 1995): 39. 
43. Reif and Niedermayer, "European Parliament and the Political Parties," p. 163. 
44. Ibid., p. 164. 
45. See Christianne C. Hardy, "European Political Parties and the European Union: Some 
Disintegrating Trends of Integration," World Affairs 157 (Summer 1994): 50-58). 
46. Reif and Niedermayer, "European Parliament and the Political Parties," p. 165. 
47. Peter H. Merkl, "The Challengers and the Party Systems," in Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl, eds., 
When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1988), p. 461. 
 